

MC&G file

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FILE INFO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

8 JUL 68 02 19Z

ACTION	1	COMIREX	6	11	SA/S	16
	2		7	12		17
	3		8	13		18
	4		9	14	IRS	19
	5		10	15	ICRS	20

IN: 53038

25X1A

Return to H.C.
HC has action copy

R 172245Z

FM SSO DIA WASH DC

TO OPCEN

SSO ACSI DA

CNO

AFSSO USAF

DIRNSA

STATE RCI

ZEM

T O P S E C R E T KKKKK [] TALENT KEYHOLE CHANNELS

25X1A

CITE DIAXX 08061 JULY 1968.

PASS TO CHAIRMAN, COMIREX AND TO COMIREX MEMBERS.

AFSSO USAF PASS TO SAFSS FOR [] NRO. REFERENCE IS

25X1A

MADE TO OPCEN 6428 DTG 121839Z JULY.

1. DUE TO THE PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS EXISTING AT THIS

PARTICULAR TIME, IT IS AGREED THAT COMIREX SHOULD NOT REQUEST NRO

TO ADJUST MISSION 1104 IN SUPPORT OF THE [] PROBLEM. IT IS

25X1A

AGREED FURTHER, THAT THE MC&G WORKING GROUP SHOULD CONSULT

WITH NRO CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS IN MEETING THE OVERALL

TARGET LOCATION PROBLEM. THE REQUIREMENT FOR SUCH ALTERNATIVE

NRO and DIA
review(s) completed.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

(When Filled In)

FILE INFO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ACTION	1		6		11		16	
	2		7		12		17	
	3		8		13		18	
	4		9		14		19	
	5		10		15		20	

SOLUTIONS WAS IDENTIFIED BY THE MC&G WORKING GROUP IN A MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMIREX, ON 24 JULY 1967. IN ADDITION, IT WAS ALSO REQUESTED THAT STEPS BE TAKEN TO HAVE NRO STUDY SYSTEMS WHICH COULD MEET THIS REQUIREMENT AND PROVIDE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE OMIREX AT AN EARLY DATE. THE REQUIREMENT WAS REAFFIRMED ON 17 MAY 1968 AND A SENSE OF URGENCY WAS EXPRESSED FOR OBTAINING THE MATERIALS NECESSARY FOR ITS SATISFACTION. IN LIGHT OF THE COMIREX DECISION NOT TO RECOMMEND USE OF MISSION 1104 AGAINST THE PROBLEM AT THIS TIME AND IN CONSIDERATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS MATTER TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT COMIREX:

25X1A

(A) FORMALLY ADVISE THE NRO OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR MATERIALS IN SUPPORT OF THE TARGET POSITIONING PROBLEM; AND

(B) REQUEST THAT ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS BE PROPOSED BY NRO FOR SATISFACTION OF THE REQUIREMENT. AS A FIRST STEP, THE SUGGESTED MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MC&G AND THE NRO SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR AN EARLY AND BENEFICIAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

GP-1

270

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 19 July 1968	
TO: <input type="text"/>			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS: In view of <input type="text"/> concern regarding the future of the MC&G Working Group, you may wish to forward a copy of this resume along with the thoughts I included to him. <input type="text"/>			
FROM:			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(17)

25X1A

25X1A

25X1A

18 July 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

25X1A

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts Regarding [REDACTED]
Study

25X1A

1. In Admiral Taylor's memorandum to you of 16 July 1968 relating to COMIREX participation in the field of MC&G, the Admiral states that MC&G should not be considered as an intelligence program. However, it is his view that what you and COMIREX are now doing is making a determination of how much coverage can be allocated to MC&G without undue interference to intelligence collection. It appears to me that this is exactly what is being done. Granted, certain agency representatives on COMIREX may question the justification for requirements submitted by the MC&G Working Group, as interpreted by your immediate office. Admiral Taylor suggests that COMIREX, as soon as practicable, should get out of the business of establishing requirements for photo coverage for MC&G purposes. Here again, the only real change would be that the DoD MC&G requirements would not have to be justified to members of the Committee--unless the DoD would have an exceptionally high priority need for MC&G photography sufficiently compelling to do battle. In such a test case either COMIREX or a higher-level body or official would be required to make a decision as to whether such military need would have priority even though interfering with intelligence requirements.

2. In the memo mentioned above, General Reynolds states that his study was approved by the DCI and that implementing actions are being prepared. Of course, full understanding of this statement must await the receipt of the wording of the implementing actions. However, in reviewing the recommendations of General Reynolds' study as presented in his draft of 9 May 1968 my interpretation of each of the recommendations is as follows:


[REDACTED]
Copy 1

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1




a. Recommendation to Conclusion 1--if MC&G accuracy criteria appear more stringent than the capability of operational systems, USIB will require a thorough analysis to evaluate possible impact on NRP resources to determine whether NRO should be asked to design system components to meet such criteria but when these criteria are needed to meet military operational needs, USIB should not commit itself as an approving authority of the criteria per se.

b. Recommendation to Conclusion 2--the DCI should ask the DoD to carefully monitor coverage and recoverage needed for the MC&G data bank so as to limit excessive collection and to create savings in processing and storage. The recommendation states that COMIREX should review requests for recoverage for MC&G on the basis of the critical need versus a useful-to-have concept. (This last statement is contrary to Admiral Taylor's admonition.)

c. Recommendation to Conclusion 3--in order to arrive at a reasonable cost allocation for satisfying MC&G requirements, the DoD and NRO should identify costs of research and development undertaken strictly for MC&G purposes and that the NRO should calculate film and processing costs properly allocable to the collection of photography for MC&G purposes. (As you know, your staff feels that this latter task would necessarily involve COMIREX because of the multiple usage of some of the photography obtained.)

d. Recommendation to Conclusion 4--the DoD should determine that part of the MC&G program which should be identified with intelligence and that part which should be identified with military operations (those elements of the MC&G program that are clearly of a military operational nature). Resources used for the collection of data for the latter purpose should be considered as non-add items in the CIP insofar as the intelligence aspects of that program are concerned. This could mean that MC&G collection might be supported with resources of the NRP only if its cost, however determined, is met by other than NRP funds. The recommendation



25X1

TOP SECRET



25X1

TOP SECRET

also suggests that the DCI request the TOD group to develop reporting guidance to distinguish between intelligence and military operational aspects of the MC&G budget line items in the CIP.

e. Recommendation to Conclusion 5--although there is no recommendation, the conclusion clearly indicates that satellite photography is an essential input to the MC&G program and will continue to be so. It also indicates that there will be growing demands for satellite photographic products (presumably for civilian uses in earth resource studies as indicated on pages 30 and 31 of General Reynolds' draft study). In this eventuality, such civilian requirements for coverage, in terms of area and frequency, and for operational adjustments on special missions, would necessarily have to be reviewed and validated by COMIREX. Since anticipated civilian requirements in large part would involve area coverage in the free world, prior coordination with the MC&GWG would seem logical.

3. I feel that COMIREX will continue to have a substantial role in processing MC&G demands upon collection systems of the NRP if implementing actions referred to by General Reynolds are in fact along the lines of his draft study's recommendations and if Admiral Taylor's admonition can be interpreted as expecting COMIREX to continue to examine--not establish--MC&G requirements solely to determine that these requirements do not interfere with the primary intelligence mission of the NRP. Under no circumstances should the MC&G community of the DoD be permitted to present its requirements directly to the NRO on a competitive basis with those forwarded by COMIREX. I doubt that this would be condoned by the authorities in any case.

4. The accuracy criteria for individual map and chart scales and the priorities for area coverage provided as guidance to the MC&G Working Group are in fact established within the DoD and coordinated by DIAMC. The Working Group need not be considered as establishing MC&G collection requirements, but rather, in an advisory capacity to you and to COMIREX, to have the following task.

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000400020020-5

TOP SECRET

It should evaluate MC&G requirements and present them to COMIREX, after consideration of available systems and mission planning, in a manner that would allow COMIREX to judge with minimum difficulty whether or not the inclusion of specific MC&G requirements would interfere with the intelligence mission. The Working Group would also attempt to distinguish between those MC&G requirements that would be classed as responsive to intelligence needs and those responsive solely to military operational needs. For the latter task, there remains a good reason for the Working Group to retain a CIA member.

25X1A

4

25X1

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2004/04/13 : CIA-RDP79B01709A000400020020-5

25X1